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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA 
FUOCO, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
BENJAMIN H. \VILLIAMS and 
VERNA V. WILLIAMS, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
No. 
10362 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is the second appeal from judgments of the 
District Court of Salt Lake County in this case which 
involves a boundary line by acquiescence. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case in the second trial was tried to the court. 
From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiffs appeal. 
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The plaintiffs brought this suit against the def end-
ants to quiet title to a tract of land located in Salt 
Lake County, specifically described in the complaint, 
to enjoin the defendants from trespassing and for 
damages. The defendants answered and counterclaimed 
alleging ownership and right of possession of a spe-
cifically described tract of land and praying for in-
junctive relief and damages. The plaintiffs filed a mo-
tion for a summary judgment based on an affidavit 
and map which indicated that an overlap of approxi-
mately 20 feet was created by a tie to a "county monu-
ment in the intersection of two county roads" which 
first appears in the defendants' chain of title in a deed 
to the defendants dated October 31, 1950. (R. 7-9). 
After hearing, the trial court granted the motion 
for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had 
record title to the 20 feet. However, the court permitted 
the filing of an amended answer and counterclaim to 
plead title by adverse possession and acquiescence. (R. 
IO). Such amended pleading was filed. (R. 14-17). 
At the pre-trial conference the court ruled that before 
the defendants could present evidence upon the issue 
of adverse possession "they must supply the plaintiffs 
with a copy of the tax description showing description 
of the property under which they claim to have paid 
taxes ... at least ten days prior to the trial." (R. 
19-21). This was not done. The only remaining issue 
was title by acquiescence. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and 
judgment in their favor quieting title to the real estate 
in dispute as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The twenty-foot strip o f land in dispute is 
shown on Exhibit P-1 by the letters "ABCD", "AB" 
being the boundary line claimed by the defendants and 
"CD" being the line claimed by the plaintiffs. (R. 20). 
See also the area marked on Exhibit P-1. The property 
in question is located near the intersection of Highland 
Drive and 3900 South. Defendants built a fence along 
line "CD" a short time before the suit was filed. (R. 
66, 67) . This precipitated the suit. 
The testimony of the defendant, B. H. Williams, 
is set out rather fully because the appellants claim 
that no title by acquiescence was proved, and that if 
there is proof anywhere in the record it is by the fol-
lowing testimony. 
Mr. Williams, when asked "if there was any line 
of any kind dividing the Butterworth property" from 
that of his father stated, "There was no fence in there, 
just east of the ditch." (R. 47). Mr. Williams then 
stated that the ditch was placed there in about 1916 
or 1917 and the questioning went on to show the present 
location of the ditch. (R. 47). No statement was ever 
made that the ditch is the actual boundary. 
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Mr. Williams went on to testify that the ditch was 
used to irrigate the Butterworth property. (R. 50), 
[Butterworth land is the same as that now owned by 
Mr. Fuoco, R. 54], and that no person ever used the 
ditch to take care of land east of the ditch. ( R. 51). 
It was also stated by l\'lr. Williams that the ditch "was 
deep enough to be clearly seen at any and all times" 
since 1920. (R. 53). And, that neither Mr. Butter-
worth, nor any other owner of this property, made any 
claims to any land east of the ditch. ( R. 54) . 
On cross-examination, the ditch was described as 
follows: 
"Q. How deep and wide was that ditch as it ran 
south from the point where it crosed the lane? 
A. It was two good plow furrows, 12-inch plow 
furroughs. 
Q. In other words, what would a plow furrow 
be? 
A. 12 inches. 
Q. 12 inches by 6 or 8 inches deep? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you think the ditch would be maybe 2 
feet wide, 6 or 8 inches deep? 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 65}. 
Also: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Young - or Mr. Williams, I 
think you have testified that that ditch has never 
been changed in location since it was built along 
about 1915 or 1916? 
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A. A foot or two east or west. 
Q. Has it been moved east or west 1 
A. That is what I say, it could have been moved 
east or west. 
Q. It could have been moved a foot or two east 
or west? 
A. It is in the same location as it is located in 
now. 
Q. I will ask you if it is in the same location now 
as it was in 1950? 
A. Yes, that is right. That is where the ditch is, 
just west of my f enceline." (R. 65, 66). 
With respect to the ditch, plaintiff, Mr. Fuoco, 
testified that he didn't see a ditch when he walked over 
the ground before purchasing (R. 91), nor later (R. 
99). Plaintiff's witnesses, Janet Sander and Frank 
Young described the ditch as "not much of a ditch," 
(R. 144) and "a little ditch that runs south, but it 
wasn't up to much." (R. 150). Plaintiffs' witness, Grace 
Young, describing the ditch, stated, "I would say like 
I said, that somebody just took a shovel and shoveled 
it off." 
With respect to the entire Fuoco tract of land, 
it was clearly shown in the trial that for a number of 
years this area had grown up in weeds. (R. 81, 120, 
121, 142, 155). Williams said it had been in weeds 
except for one year, since 1939. (R. 81). Mr. Oman 
stipulated that "it has grown in weeds for the last 
fifteen years or so." (R. 142). 
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Mr. Williams testified that he leased and farmed 
what is now the Fuoco property in 1923 or 1924 and 
then his father leased it from about 1925 to 1934. (R. 
79, 80). Williams again used the Fuoco land from 1934 
to 1937 and Leone Le Chaminant farmed it from 1937 
to 1939. From 1939 to 1959 the irrigation ditch was 
not used except for one year. (R. 81, 82). 
The Williams land east of the ditch was used for 
a manure pile and stack yard until about 1938 when 
the barn was moved. ( R. 71-73) . There is no evidence 
of use until 1950 when Williams planted a garden. 
(R. 83). 
The only other testimony of Mr. Williams which 
bears on the question of acquiescence is as follows: 
"Q. Mr. Williams, as to any work you did, or 
your father did, raising crops over on Butter-
worth's land, did you divide the crop between 
yourself and Butterworth? 
A. Yes. We took two thirds and gave Butter-
worth one-third. 
Q. And I asked you what line you used to divide 
the Butterworth crop from your crop. 
MR. SKEEN: I object as calling for a con-
clusion of the witness. 
MR. OMAN: He did the work. 
MR. SKEEN: It is a conclusion to say what 
line was adopted and further it is leading. 
THE COURT: Use the word 'ditch' then. 
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l\IR. 0 MAN: I beg your pardon, your Honor. 
I didn't hear you. 
THE COURT: Restate the question. 
Q. (By Mr. Oman) l\fr. Williams, did you di-
vide with Butterworth all crops raised on the 
west side of this d)_tch we have been talking 
about? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you give him any part of the crop raised 
on the east side of that ditch? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You claimed that property as your own? 
A. Yes, sir." (R. 83, 84). 
The trial court found in favor of the defendants 
as to the location of the ditch and acquiescence in the 
ditch as a. boundary line. ( R. 26-28) . 
This appeal is taken from the judgment of the 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The defendants failed to prove the long, con-
tinued existence of a monument definitely establishing 
a boundary line. 
2. There is no evidence that the parties mutually 
recognized the ditch as the boundary line. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENDANTS FAILED TO 
PROVE THE LONG, CONTINUED EXIST-
ENCE OF A MONUMENT DEFINITELY ES-
TABLISHING A BOUNDARY LINE. 
As indicated in the trial, all of the issues in this 
case have been resolved, except the issue of title by 
acquiescence. ( R. 45) . The record title to the twenty-
foot strip of land in dispute is in the appellants. 
This Court has held that in order to make a case 
under the acquiescence doctrine, it must be shown: 
( 1) There was uncertainty as to the location of 
the true boundary. 
( 2) The parties have occupied their respective 
parcels up to an open boundary line, visibly marked 
by monuments, fences or buildings. 
(3) The monument, fence or building must have 
existed for a long period of time. 
( 4) The monument, fence or building must have 
been mutually recognized as the dividing line. 
Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d 
143; King vs. Fronk, 14 Utah 135, 378 P.2d 893; 
Brown vs. Milliner, 120 Utah 16, 232 P.2d 202; Glenn 
vs. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209 P.2d 257; Ringwood 
vs. Bradford, 2 Utah 2d 119, 269 P.2d 1053; Hummel 
vs. Young, 1 Utah 2d 237, 265 P.2d 410. 
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.. 
In the case of King vs. Fronk, supra, the court 
referred to the boundary marked on the ground as 
"monuments visibly placed," "monumented line," and 
an "existing line marked by monuments." The only 
basis for acquiescence in this case was considering the 
irrigation ditch to be a "monument" within the mean-
ing of the rule. 
A monument is defined by the dictionary as "per-
manent landmarks established for the purpose of indi-
cating boundaries." Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third 
Edition. 
Obvioulsy an irrigation ditch is not ordinarily con-
structed for the purpose of marking a boundary. It 
is used for carrying water to the place of use and must 
be constructed to conform to the slope and contour of 
the land and to connect with the water source and with 
other ditches and laterals. An irrigation ditch, particu-
larly a small ditch, would not give notice to one who 
views it that it would establish a boundary line as in 
the case of a fence or building. If we assume for the 
sake of argument that the land in each tract was occu-
pied up to a small ditch, such as the one involved here, 
this fact alone would not put the parties upon notice 
of intent to claim ownership of the ditch. A landowner 
"could not irrigate uphill from a ditch" and the fact 
that his neighbor used the land to the ditch could easily 
be explained as a neighborly act or a grant of license. 
From the evidence it is clear that there was not 
a monument of the kind contemplated by the rule and 
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there is no evidence that there was anything on the 
ground of long and continued existence definitely 
establishing a boundary line. It was stipulated that the 
Fuoco property, including the twenty-foot strip, was 
in weeds for at least 15 years immediately prior to the 
filing of this suit. (R. 142). As indicated above, Wil-
liams testified that the ditch was only used in one year 
from 1939 to 1959. (R. 81, 82). 
Because the whole tract of land was in weeds for 
such a long period of time, it is evident that the parties 
were not occupying up to an open boundary line, visibly 
marked, as is required for acquiescence in this juris-
diction. King vs. Fronk, supra. See page 7 of this 
brief. 
The ditch, it was testified to by Mr. Williams, has 
been moved "a foot or two east or west," or "Could 
have been moved a foot or two east or west." (R. 65, 
66). A boundary which has been moved or could have 
been moved, even a foot or two, does not ftP within 
the definition of a "monument,"-see page ~ of this 
brief ,-as it is not a permanent landmark. A boundary 
to land cannot be such that it can be moved around 
at will, this is another reason why the ditch in this case 
should not be considered a long, existing monument 
establishing a boundary. 
The location of the ditch was also disputed. Mr. 
Williams tied the location of the line to two landmarks. 
One was "just east of the ditch." (R. 47). The present 
fence was built "right on the edge" of the ditch, (R. 
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53) and the present fence, he stated, is "about in the 
same line" as some old fence posts which have since 
rotted out. (R. 62). The present fence was constructed 
shortly before the trial (R. 66, 67) so this attempted 
tie is of little help. Mr. Williams then said the fence 
along the east side of Frank Young's property, the 
property north of the lane, has been within a foot or 
two of its present location for 60 years. (R. 63, 118). 
The Young fence is shown on Exhibit P-1 by some 
red crosses. (R. 118). Mr. Williams did not tie thf 
present fence or the old fence posts with anything but 
the present ditch, or with the west side of his father's 
property. (R. 62). 
The second reference point used was an old flume 
which crossed the lane and carried water to the ditch 
in question. This, it was stated by the witnesses testify-
ing to it, crossed the lane at the south end of the Young 
fence. (R. 64, 119, 150, 168). Mr. Williams said the 
ditch crossed the lane and ran 18 or 20 feet west before 
going directly south. (R. 65). Plaintiffs' disinterested 
witnesses testified that the ditch ran directly south from 
the flume as follows: 
Mr. Sanders: The old fence posts were in line with 
the Young fence and the ditch ran "directly south" of 
where it crossed the lane. "There was no jog in there." 
(R. 134). 
Mr. Young: The ditch ran south, "just on a de-
gree to the southwest." But, there were no jogs. "It 
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run straight, come across the road and run straight 
down in front of the barn." (R. 150, 151). 
Mrs. Sander: The ditch went south from the flume. 
(R. 143-144). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Williams was asked 
to locate the old fence posts on the map. In so doing, 
he placed some pen circles on the red line, "CD", on 
Exhibit P-1. (R. 62). That line is the line plaintiffs 
are claiming and the circles were also placed on a line 
with the fence on the east side of Frank Young's prop-
erty. It should be noted that the flume was also on this 
line. (See Exhibit P-1). 
We submit that the evidence fails to show a monu-
ment of any kind which was intended to establish a 
boundary and that the evidence is in dispute as to the 
location of the small ditch which it is claimed by the 
defendants marks the boundary. Williams' evidence as 
to location is contradictory and vague. He testified 
that the ditch was located near old fence posts which 
he indicated on the map Exhibit P-1 exactly on the 
boundary line claimed by the plaintiffs; (R. 118), and 
then on redirect testified in response to a leading ques-
tion that he intended to put the marks where the 
present fence is located. (R. 30-31). He admitted the 
ditch had been moved and all the distinterested wit-
nesses whose testimony is quoted above testified that 
the old ditch, prior to 1954, had been about 20 feet 
east of the present ditch. It is apparent from the fore-
going that if a small, two-plow furrow ditch can be 
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used as a "definite" monument within the rule of this 
court established in this case on the previous appeal, 
and in King vs. Fronk, supra, confusion and chaos 
in land cases will be the result. 
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF MUTUAL 
RECOGNITION OF THE DITCH AS A 
BOUNDARY LINE OVER A LONG PERIOD 
OF TIME. 
The record discloses the following with respect to 
ownership of the land on each side of the ditch as fol-
lows: 
Williams Property 
Prior to 1935 
1935 to 1950 
1950 to present 
Fuoco Property 
1896 to 1936 
1936 to 1951 
1951 to 1959 
1959 to present 
Henry Benjamin Williams 
Mercy Hodgson Williams 
Defendants (R. 9) 
Melinda H. Butterworth 
Annie N. M. Christensen and 
Effie G. Butterworth 
H. Leland Christensen 
Plaintiffs (R. 8, 9) . 
During the tweny-year period prior to the com-
mencement of suit, from 1942 to 1962, there is no evi-
dence of recognition of the ditch as a boundary line by 
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Fuoco and his predecessors in interest. There is no 
evidence by written or oral agreement or by acts or 
conduct. In fact, the testimony of the defendant, Ben-
jamin Williams, is that for a period of 20 years from 
1939 to 1959 the Fuoco property was cultivated only 
one year (Williams did not know what year) and the 
rest of the time it grew up in weeds. (R. 81, 82). It 
was held in the case of Fuoco vs. Williams, supra, that 
use of the land up to a ditch on each side of the ditch is 
not such acts or conduct as would show mutual recog-
nition of the ditch as a boundary line. The Court said: 
" ... In the case at bar it was conceded that 
defendants had occupied the land up to the ditch 
for a long period of years and that the dispute 
was between adjoining land owners. The evi-
dence presented shows the ditch was used for 
irrigation purposes and the record is void of 
any evidence showing that the plaintiffs' prede-
cessors ever acquiesced in it as a boundary line; 
therefore, the first issue must be resolved in favor 
of the plaintiffs. 
As to the second issue, we believe that the 
court erred in telling the jury that the only 
question was the location of the small irrigation 
ditch, since such presentation to the jury was 
based on the assumption that the irrigation ditch 
was dug where it was for the purpose of estab-
lishing a boundarJJ and not for the purpose of 
irrigating land. Any number of ditches could 
criss-cross one's property for the purpose of irri-
gating land without any contention or realistic 
assumption that they were to be boundary lines, 
-even though by permission, others may have 
used the dry land in between. . . . " 
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The Court reversed and remanded with the fol-
lowing instructions : 
"Therefore, the judgment of the trial court 
is reversed and remanded for a new trial with 
instructions to the effect that the judge or jury 
should determine the matters of whether the 
ditch was acquiesced in over a long period of 
time, as a boundary and not simply as an irri-
gation medium .... " 
In the second trial, as indicated above, there is 
not only a failure on the part of the defendants to show 
acquiescence in the ditch as a boundary over a long 
period of time, but the proof is that there was no occu-
pancy up to the ditch. The land grew up in weeds 
(except for one year) from 1939 to 1959. This testi-
mony of Williams certainly negatives occupation up 
to the ditch and makes this case weaker than the one 
which was reversed. 
During the period from 1923 to 1924 the evidence 
is that Benjamin Williams leased what is now the 
Fuoco property and farmed the land on both sides of 
the ditch on a crop share basis. Williams testified that 
during that period of time the crop returns on the land 
west of the ditch were divided on the basis of one-third 
and two-thirds with Butterworth. Butterworth is re-
ferred to as "him" (R. 83) and neither his relationship 
to the record owner, Melinda Butterworth, nor his 
identity is disclosed in the record. There is no evidence 
that Williams' father, who succeeded Williams as lessee 
from 1924 to 1934, divided the crop proceeds on the 
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basis of the ditch. ( R. 80) . Thus, for a period of 29 
years out of the 38 years immediately prior to filing 
the suit (for 19 years it was in weeds and for 10 years 
it was leased by Williams (R. 80) )-the defendants 
could not have been occupying the land adversely to 
plaintiffs or their predecessors. If the division of crop 
receipts constituted acquiescence it was only for one 
year and did not meet the requirement of "acquiescence 
over a long period of time." 
Under a familiar rule of law, a lessee cannot take 
advantage of the landlord and tenant relationship to 
defeat the title of the landlord. The rule in this juris-
diction is stated in Woodbury vs. Bunker, 98 Utah 
216, 98 P.2d 948, as follows: 
" ... So long as the tenant remains in posses-
sion, his possession is that of the landlord, and 
he cannot by words or acts make his possession 
of that of one whom he permits upon the prem-
ises a possession adverse to the landlord .... " 
The defendants having failed to prove the neces-
sary elements of a title by acquiescence, the record 
boundary line "CD", Exhibit P-1, must stand as the 
true boundary. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
must be reversed. The District Court should be di-
rected to enter a judgment for the appellants. 
E.J. SKEEN 
522 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
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